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Transnational Carbon-Trading Standards: 
Improving the Transparency and 
Coordination of Post-Kyoto Carbon Trading 
Markets 
BRADEN SMITH  
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Carbon trading markets are operating or in development in 
the European Union (EU Emission Trading Scheme), Australia, 
New Zealand, Tokyo, Japan, and through regional initiatives in 
the United States.  However, problems regarding the 
transparency of tradable carbon credits or offsets, especially the 
transnational monitoring of compliance with carbon emission 
limits established through national permits, have slowed the 
implementation of these initiatives.1  Given the large question 
marks that still hover over the Kyoto Protocol ’s legally binding 
commitments,2 and given the gridlock that plagues the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
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feedback throughout the process, my classmates in both Pace’s U.N.  
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 1. See Henrik Hasselknippe, Systems for carbon trading: an overview, 3 
CLIMATE POL’Y S43, S44 (2003). 
 2. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
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process, there is currently no internationally accepted method on 
how to monitor or verify emissions reductions that would allow 
carbon trading between distinct international markets.3  Given 
the slow progress of UNFCCC negotiations, an alternative 
approach may be to develop a transnational auditing standard 
that would allow participating members to adopt uniform 
standards for credits and offsets that would be both transparent 
to investors and enforceable.4 
This Comment will provide a brief survey of the regulatory 
frameworks adopted by regional carbon trading markets to 
monitor, report, and verify (MRV) carbon emissions.  It will then 
examine whether existing MRV regulations are sufficient to allow 
inter-regional cooperation between carbon trading markets, in 
particular, whether the MRV procedures are sufficient to allow 
the interchangeable carbon credits and offsets envisioned by the 
Kyoto Protocol.5  After reviewing the difficulties associated with 
creating harmonized MRV procedures in the absence of clearly 
delineated legal commitments in the Kyoto Protocol, the 
Comment will suggest how transnational environmental auditing 
standards might provide a temporary solution that will facilitate 
greater harmonization between regional markets in the absence 
of legally binding commitments from Annex I states. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol mandated that member states 
develop and implement monitoring, verification, and compliance 
measures that would allow the development of carbon trading 
markets.6  The vision of the Kyoto Protocol was to regulate carbon 
markets across national boundaries using the annual Conference 
 
 3. See Radoslav S. Dimitrov, Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate 
Governance, 10 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 18 (2010). 
 4. See Paula C. Murray, International Environmental Management 
Standard, ISO 14000: A Non-Tariff Barrier or a Step to an Emerging Global 
Environmental Policy, 18 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 577 (1997). 
 5. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 17; United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, Oct 29-Nov. 10, 2001, Marrakesh, Morocco, 7th 
Sess., Report of the Conference of the Parties,  50, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2001/13/Add.2 (Jan. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol Modalities, 
rules and guidelines]. 
 6. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 17. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8
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of Parties (COP) to set the rules and standards for each market.7  
A single, coherent regulatory framework would allow the 
components of the Kyoto Protocol, such as the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI) projects, to 
work in tandem with international emissions trading markets in 
each country or region.8  A project funded under the CDM, such 
as setting aside 5,000 acres of rainforest in Brazil for 
conservation, could then be verified as either a carbon credit or 
an offset and traded to an Annex I country to allow a more 
efficient allocation of market resources.9 
The development of international carbon trading markets 
has made slow progress since 1997, but current discussions have 
become bogged down in finger-pointing between Annex I states, 
and the rapidly growing non-Annex I developing countries, such 
as China, India, and Brazil.10  Despite technical developments in 
MRV procedures taking place in the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body 
for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA), the commitment of 
Kyoto parties to participating in international trading of carbon 
credits has waned.  A tentative agreement at the seventeenth 
meeting of the UNFCCC’s Conference of Parties in Durban (COP 
17) to continue the Kyoto legally binding commitments beyond 
2012 will depend on negotiators being able to bridge the gap 
between Annex I and non-Annex I parties.11 
Although carbon trading within the Kyoto Protocol appears 
to be stalled, carbon trading markets continue to develop 
regionally.  The European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme 
(ETS), launched in 2005, includes a formalized auditing process, 
 
 7. Id. at art. 3, para. 4. 
 8. Edwin Woerdman, Implementing the Kyoto protocol: why JI and CDM 
show more promise than international emissions trading, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 1, 29-
30 (2000). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Gloria Jean Gong, What China wants: China's climate change priorities 
in a post-Copenhagen world, 23 GLOBAL CHANGE, PEACE & SEC. 159, 171 (2011). 
 11. Interviews with climate change negotiators from Pacific Small Island 
Developing States (PSIDS).  Negotiations to determine the future of legally 
binding international commitments will now be carried out under a separate 
institutional framework called the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban 
Platform for Enhanced Action.  United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change, Durban, S. Afr., Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the 
Conference of the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, 6, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
3
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an extensive monitoring and verification system, and an active, if 
not particularly well-regulated, carbon offset market.12  Australia 
has a plan in place for emissions trading to begin in 2012, but 
political developments in the country will likely push back 
implementation until 2013.13  New Zealand has a functional 
carbon market, with a well-regulated monitoring and verification 
regime, but has not implemented any emissions caps.14  There 
are plans in Japan to develop a nationwide market, but it 
currently remains regional.15 
Even within the United States, carbon markets are 
developing at a regional level.  The Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic includes a 
commitment to use carbon trading to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions by 10% by 2020.16  So far, the program is designed to 
target emissions from fossil fuel-fired electric power generators, 
which is less ambitious than most carbon trading markets.17  
California’s carbon trading scheme is similar, but progress has 
been delayed due to logistical problems.18  The situation in the 
United States is even more difficult given the concurrent 
authority of the federal government, and the U.S. EPA ’s plan to 
regulate greenhouse gas emissions through its existing authority 
(as a consequence of Massachusetts v. EPA).19 
Monitoring and enforcement of a carbon trading market is an 
extremely technical process, requiring close cooperation between 
 
 12. A. Denny Ellerman & Barbara K. Buchner, The European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, 1 REV. 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 66, 67-69 (2007). 
 13. Regina Betz & Anthony D. Owen, The implications of Australia’s carbon 
pollution reduction scheme for its National Electricity Market, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 
4966 (2010). 
 14. Slobodan Perdan & Adisa Azapagic, Carbon trading: Current schemes 
and future developments, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 6040, 6045-46 (2011). 
 15. Id. at 6046-47. 
 16. Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities As Actors in Global Climate 
Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681 (2008). 
 17. Perdan & Azapagic, supra note 14, at 6044-45. 
 18. Cal. EPA Air Res. Bd., Cap and Trade Program, CA.GOV, 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 
2012). 
 19. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (establishing EPA 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act);  Jody Freeman 
& Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts V EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. 
CT. REV. 51, 72 (2007). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8
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public and private sectors.  Even Annex I developed countries are 
having difficulty establishing robust monitoring and enforcement 
regimes, and those states that have implemented carbon trading 
markets are finding that without transparency between 
investors, emitters, and carbon brokers, actual emissions as 
credited may not reflect the real reduction of emissions.20  The 
EPA’s roll-out of its emissions monitoring regulations provide a 
good example of the technical problems associated with 
monitoring emitters on an annual basis.  It calls for annual 
submissions of greenhouse emissions, but so far the agency has 
refused to bring enforcement actions against emission sources 
that declined to submit a 2011 report.21  Although some high-tech 
solutions are being developed, like monitoring from satellites, it 
remains very difficult for third parties to monitor changes in 
emissions.22  Interested third parties, such as brokers looking for 
offsets in developing countries, are often at the mercy of 
voluntary or non-existent domestic regulations.  Rainforests that 
are accounted for on a company’s books may not be conserved 
long enough to qualify as an offset. 
Properly regulated tradable emissions credits are the life -
blood of a successful market-based approach to reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions.  The credit is an artificial construct 
created by market regulators to transform amorphous, and often 
unrelated, human activities, such as raising livestock or 
operating a natural-gas fired power plant, into a single, 
comparable commodity.23  Through the work of scientists at the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and the 
UNFCCC, an emission unit has become universally defined as 
 
 20. Peter Bohm, International Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading—With 
Special Reference to the Kyoto Protocol, in EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY OF CLIMATE 
CHANGE POLICY (Carlo Carraro ed., 2000). 
 21. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56,259, 56,379-
80 (Oct. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 98). 
 22. Ake Rosenqvist et al., A review of remote sensing technology in support of 
the Kyoto Protocol, 6 ENVTL. SCI. & POL’Y 441, 441 (2003). 
 23. Some have described it as a currency.  The difference might seem slight, 
but its implications are important for how regulators decide to treat market 
activity. For the purposes of this paper, carbon credits will be treated as a 
commodity, albeit, a heavily regulated one. See Jillian Button, Note, Carbon: 
Commodity or Currency? The Case for an International Carbon Market Based on 
the Currency Model, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 571 (2008). 
5
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one ton of a CO2 equivalent greenhouse gas.24  Like any 
commodity, certain important differences are lost during the 
standardization process.  For example, methane has other 
features that make it a potentially more problematic greenhouse 
gas, but for the purposes of a tradable scheme, it gets treated as 
equivalent to carbon dioxide so that the emission of either gas can 
be tradable.25  The Kyoto negotiators could have tried to treat 
each gas separately, but proponents of market-based approaches 
were strong advocates of a standardized approach, in part 
because standardization allows carbon-trading markets to 
achieve a greater level of efficiency.26  Every participating 
industry can then calculate its baseline emissions in the form of 
CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases, allowing a sheep rancher in 
New Zealand to trade its carbon-emitting activity with an airline 
operator in London. 
Once the market regulator establishes a standardized unit of 
measurement, it can then establish a cap.  The cap is the total 
amount of carbon that can be emitted by regulated industries 
during a given year (this could be any time interval, but annual 
reporting is the most commonly used method).  Various market 
regulators have established caps using different methods.  For 
those countries participating in the Kyoto Protocol, one would 
assume that the cap to use would be their country ’s legally 
binding commitment contained in Annex I.27  However, for 
political reasons, most regulators have adopted caps that 
reference Annex I commitments, but with yearly limits that are 
deliberately less stringent than would otherwise be required.28  
 
 24. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON NAT’L GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REVISED 1996 IPCC 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES (1996). 
 25. Daniel A. Lashof & Dilip R. Ahuja, Relative contributions of greenhouse 
gas emissions to global warming, 344 NATURE  529, 529-31 (1990). 
 26. Leif Gustavsson et al., Project-based greenhouse-gas accounting: guiding 
principles with a focus on baselines and additionality, 28 ENERGY POL’Y 935, 936 
(2000). 
 27. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 3. 
 28. For example, the European Union is operating under a cap that commits 
to reducing the region’s GHGs by 20% by 2020. Council Directive 2009/406, 2009 
O.J. (L 140) 136, 137 (EC) (decision of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 April 2009 on the effort of Member States to reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions to meet the Community’s greenhouse gas emission 
reduction commitments up to 2020).  In its March 2007 Directive, the Council 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8
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Of the most substantial carbon-trading markets in operation 
worldwide, only the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI), 
which operates under a Memorandum of Understanding between 
Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont, has set 
emission reduction targets without any reference to the Kyoto 
commitments.29 
The cap is then used to produce a tradable credit, which is 
typically calculated as a certain share of CO2 equivalent 
greenhouse gases.  Shares are then allocated to different emitters 
based on either an auction, the historical needs of the industry, or 
through a random distribution.30  An emitter must have the 
necessary carbon credits in order to emit its annual share of CO2 
equivalent greenhouse gases.  If they are short in a given year, 
they can purchase additional credits, reduce emissions to the 
allowable amount, or pay a penalty.  Most markets, especially 
those that allocate credits through an auction, will allow 
intermediaries, such as brokers, to purchase and trade credits.31 
In an ideal world, brokers improve market liquidity by 
allowing emitters to more easily buy and sell credits depending 
 
recognized that this was insufficient, but said that a higher cap of around 30% 
would only take place “provided that other developed countries commit 
themselves to comparable emission reductions and economically more advanced 
developing countries commit themselves to contributing adequately according to 
their responsibilities and capabilities.” Id. at 136. 
 29. The United States was a signatory to the original Kyoto Protocol, and was 
instrumental in negotiating the agreed-upon commitments, but withdrew its 
intention to ratify in 2001.  RGGI is a regional initiative based on an 
independently set cap negotiated between the participating state governments.  
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative Memorandum of Understanding 2-3 (Dec. 
20, 2005), available at http://www.rggi.org/ docs/mou_final_12_20_05.pdf.  New 
Jersey’s governor has recently expressed his desire to withdraw from RGGI; 
however, state legislators are challenging the governor’s authority to withdraw.  
Mireya Navarro, Christie Pulls New Jersey From 10-State Climate Initiative, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2011, at A20. 
 30. The U.S. EPA provides an excellent handbook that introduces the basic 
features of a cap and trade system. EPA OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, EPA430-B-
03-002, TOOLS OF THE TRADE: A GUIDE TO DESIGNING AND OPERATING A CAP AND 
TRADE PROGRAM FOR POLLUTION CONTROL 3.14-3.23 (2003), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/tools.pdf [hereinafter OFFICE OF 
AIR & RADIATION]. 
 31. See, e.g., U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, DIV. OF TECH., INDUS., & ECON., AN 
EMERGING MARKET FOR THE ENVIRONMENT: A GUIDE TO EMISSIONS TRADING 4-8 
(2002) [hereinafter DIV. OF TECH., INDUS., & ECON.]. 
7
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on changes in their industry.32  For example, coal-fired power 
plant operators saddled with older facilities can calculate whether 
investing in new technology would be more cost-effective than 
purchasing credits.  A command and control approach, 
exemplified by the Clean Air Act’s technology provisions, would 
only focus on mandating new technology.33  A carbon market is 
still regulatory, in the sense that it forces market participants to 
make decisions based on external factors, but allows emitters 
greater flexibility.  For international carbon-credit transactions, 
brokers play a particularly important role because emitters are 
generally reluctant to enter contractual arrangements with other 
emitters without a firm commitment that they will receive a 
specified amount of credits.  Brokers can more easily commit to 
purchasing credits created through offsets because at the end of 
the year they are not liable if an eventual offset produces less 
credits then was originally anticipated.34 
In practice, a tradable emissions system, whether 
implemented between states or between companies, should 
produce an economically efficient outcome for all participating 
parties.  A company whose average cost of making technological 
improvements to reduce carbon emissions is comparatively high 
can use a market-based system to buy permits to allow higher 
levels of emissions.  Likewise, a company whose average cost is 
comparatively low can profit by selling credits gained through 
emission reductions.  If the regulating authority commits to 
periodically reducing the overall permitted level of emissions, 
significant emission reductions can be achieved without imposing 
as high a cost on the average emitter.35 
This system works particularly well for greenhouse gas 
emissions because the cumulative effect of anthropogenic 
warming of Earth’s climate is felt globally, rather than locally.  
For example, if a particular emitter of mercury were allowed to 
buy permits to emit more mercury in a year than another facility, 
 
 32. Paul G. Miclăuş et al., Testing the Efficiency of the European Carbon 
Futures Market using Event-Study Methodology, 2  INT’L J. ENERGY & ENV'T 121, 
121 (2008) (modeling the efficiency of futures price-setting in the EU Emission 
Trading Scheme). 
 33. OFFICE OF AIR & RADIATION, supra note 30, at 2.1-2.5. 
 34. See DIV. OF TECH., INDUS., & ECON., supra note 31, at 10. 
 35. See id. at 36-37. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8
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a region downwind of that facility would suffer disproportionate 
health effects.36  Although that result might be economically 
efficient from an emitter’s perspective, the subsequent harm 
caused to the downwind community might be considered an 
unacceptable trade-off.  However, allowing a facility to emit more 
CO2 will generally not cause localized, adverse health effects to a 
downwind community.37  Of course, this is also one of the primary 
reasons why limiting CO2 emissions is such a difficult public 
policy problem.  Maintaining a climate suitable for human 
habitation and growth is as close to a pure public good as 
economics can hypothesize, which makes it all the more difficult 
for states to properly assign the costs of regulating such a good.38 
Carbon markets achieve greater economic efficiency when 
they include a larger number of market participants.39  
Domestically, this is taking place by expanding the number of 
industries participating in carbon-trading schemes.  For example, 
the EU’s ETS began by targeting fossil fuel-fired electrical energy 
generators, which are typically easiest to incorporate into a 
regulatory scheme because they are likely already being 
monitored for other emissions, such as hazardous pollutants.40  
However, non-point sources of carbon emissions, such as 
automobiles, agricultural production, and the airline industry 
actually emit a greater percentage of the EU’s annual 
emissions.41  Since the EU’s ETS was originally designed to 
 
 36. See Kris Christen, Perspective: Mercury trading scheme raises concerns, 
38 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 126A (2004). 
 37. It is important to note that CO2 is rarely the only gas emitted from an 
industrial facility. A tradable emissions scheme may be a good method of 
reducing overall emissions, but it cannot substitute for technology- or air-
quality-based regulations of other harmful pollutants. 
 38. The two key components of a public good is that it is non-rival, in other 
words “each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions 
from any other individual’s consumption of that good,” and non-excludable. Paul 
A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 
387, 387 (1954). 
 39. See Valentina Bosetti et al., Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and 
Distributional Effects 12 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 
6652, 2008). 
 40. Council Directive 2003/87, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC) (establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community 
and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC). 
 41. DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR ENERGY & TRANSPORT, EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EU 
ENERGY FIGURES IN 2010 2 (2010). 
9
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eventually meet the Kyoto Protocol ’s Annex I commitments for 
each European country, skeptics were quick to point out that the 
ETS’s limited applicability placed electrical energy generators at 
a severe disadvantage.42  If the ETS became the primary 
mechanism for complying with Kyoto, the electrical energy 
generators (and those industries that depend heavily on 
electricity) would be forced to shoulder a disproportionately large 
share of the burden. 
Thus, since the creation of the ETS, the Commission has 
tried to gradually expand the number of participating industries.  
This produced a significant amount of controversy when the 
Commission included Europe ’s air carriers.43  The airline 
industry faces intense international competition, and the airlines 
argued that the ETS would place them at a disadvantage.  New 
Zealand appears to have learned a valuable lesson from the EU’s 
experience, because its market already encompasses a more 
diverse set of market participants, including agricultural farms 
and forestry products.44  Yet, even a more diverse mixture of 
market participants does not guarantee a market that trades 
with enough volume to ensure adequate protections against 
unfair market practices.  The EU’s system has been criticized for 
being notoriously thin, and susceptible to market manipulation.45  
New Zealand’s system is also very thin, with only ninety-six 
mandatory participants as of June 2011, although that number 
will rise once additional sectors are brought into the system.46 
One of the biggest challenges for carbon trading is the high 
transaction costs associated with establishing MRV procedures.47  
Since the thin line between profit and loss in a carbon market 
 
 42. Stephen Gardner, EU ETS: The Winners and Losers of EU Carbon 
Trading, KLEANINDUSTRIES (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.kleanindustries.com/s/ 
environmental_market_Industry_news.asp?ReportID=320988. 
 43. See M. Vittoria Giugi Carminati, Clean Air & Stormy Skies: The EU-ETS 
Imposing Carbon Credit Purchases on United States Airlines, 37 SYRACUSE J. 
INT'L L. & COM. 127 (2010). 
 44. Perdan & Azapagic, supra note 14, at 6045-46. 
 45. See Marius-Cristian Frunza et al., Missing trader fraud on the emissions 
market, 18 J. FIN. CRIME 183 (2011). 
 46. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, REPORT ON THE NEW ZEALAND 
EMISSION TRADING SCHEME 7 (2011) [hereinafter N.Z. EMISSIONS TRADING 
SCHEME]. 
 47. Robert N. Stavins, What Can We Learn from the Grand Policy 
Experiment? SO2 Allowance Trading, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 69 (1998). 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8
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depends on the reliability and long-term trajectory of emissions 
by market participants, confidence in the market can only be 
developed if each participant can trust that emissions are 
properly monitored, verified by an independent agency, and that 
any violators are appropriately punished.48  In economics, these 
represent classic transaction costs.  A carbon market is unlikely 
to succeed without a strong, independent regulatory agency 
ensuring that each market participant plays by the rules.  
Independent regulation by industry will not generate the level of 
confidence in emissions reductions necessary for financial brokers 
to enter the market and assume a proportion of the liability 
associated with trading carbon emission credits. 
III. IMPORTANCE OF MONITORING, REPORTING, 
AND VERIFICATION PROCEDURES 
Unlike other commodities, carbon credits are not easily 
distinguishable physical objects.  Creating a credit depends on (1) 
the accuracy of the measurement techniques used to determine 
the level of emitted CO2 equivalent greenhouse gases, (2) 
recognition by a market regulator that an emitter has 
demonstrated an overall change in their level of annual 
emissions, (3) independent verification that industry reporting 
reflects an actual reduction rather than an accounting gimmick, 
and finally, (4) recognition by buyers that an emission-reduction 
can be properly credited to the seller.49  MRV procedures, which 
have been widely used in a variety of market-based regulatory 
approaches, become vitally important for maintaining the 
integrity, transparency, and vitality of carbon-trading markets.50  
MRVs can include a variety of different elements, but typically 
involve the use of either continuous or on-site monitoring by an 
independent agency, electronic records kept by the emitter and 
available for auditing at the request of a market regulator, 
trained and competent on-site inspectors with the authority to 
 
 48. Id. at 79. 
 49. Verification includes not only appropriate recognition by the market 
regulator that a reduction has taken place, but also assurances against fraud or 
misrepresentation. 
 50. John Schakenback et al., Fundamentals of Successful Monitoring, 
Reporting, and Verification under a Cap-and-Trade Program, 56 J. AIR & WASTE 
MGMT. ASS'N 1576, 1576 (2006). 
11
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extensively review a company’s emission records, and incentives 
or penalties with sufficient size to deter any potential fraud or 
negligence.51 
The U.S. EPA’s NOx Budget Trading Program and its Acid 
Rain Program, both market-based tradable emissions schemes, 
provide an excellent example of successfully implemented MRVs.  
Both programs are built on strong equipment performance 
standards, which ensure that monitoring techniques and 
technologies are up to the challenge of providing a reliable data 
stream.52  That data is stored electronically, and the EPA 
provides the emitter with software allowing the reporter to 
identify and potentially correct any errors before submitting a 
compliance report.53  Emitter self-reporting is then supplemented 
with a rigorous random audit and inspection process based on 
identifying any statistical anomalies in the emitter ’s electronic 
records that might suggest fraud or mistake.54  An incentive and 
penalty system functions as a supplement to these quality 
assurance measures, bringing a larger percentage of the 
regulated industry into voluntary compliance.55  A significant 
amount of time is spent collaborating with emitting sources to 
determine how to minimize errors and avoid unintended 
noncompliance. 
High quality MRVs are vital in order to establish confidence 
in the value of a credit.  Hypothetically, market regulators should 
be able to manage the risk and distribution of credits by tweaking 
the cap.  However, as the EU’s regulators learned, errors in 
calculating the cap or significant policy adjustments can cause 
massive fluctuations in the value of a credit in the domestic 
market.56  When those fluctuations are the result of the market 
anticipating or reacting to a regulatory agency’s decision, outside 
investors or brokers, which are vital to a successfully operating 
system, may conclude that the market is too risky to successfully 
 
 51. Id. at 1577. 
 52. Id. at 1579. 
 53. Id. at 1580-81. 
 54. Id. at 1577-78. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Regina Betz & Misato Sato, Emissions Trading: Lessons Learnt from the 
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manage.  It may also result in rapid changes in the retail price of 
energy, undermining the public’s confidence in the system’s 
reliability.57 
Although command and control regulatory structures also 
emphasize MRVs, the threat of litigation and the absence of any 
intrinsic motive to comply other than the avoidance of liability 
mean that greater time is often spent investigating and 
punishing.58  The difficulty with market-based regulations is that 
persistent regulatory noncompliance will not only result in poor 
outcomes (increased pollution), but will also undermine 
confidence in the value of tradable emissions, thereby 
endangering the value of a credit to other market participants.59  
This is a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, compliance 
appears to be even more important, which places much of the 
success or failure of a market in the hands of market regulators.  
However, firms that participate want to realize gains from 
participating in the market, which should provide an incentive to 
maintain the overall integrity of the MRV process. 
It may be easy to dismiss MRV procedures as a technical 
matter with limited applicability to the design and functioning of 
the overall carbon trading system.  In a fully integrated, well-
regulated, harmonized national regulatory structure, MRVs can 
be taken for granted.  However, the current regulatory landscape 
includes a messy combination of national authorities, 
international agreements, and private third-party brokers.  If the 
goal is to create a seamless international market for carbon, and 
thus realize the greater efficiencies from international trading, 
market participants must be confident that a credit created and 
sold in the EU’s ETS is legally recognized as equivalent to a 
credit in New Zealand’s ETS.  As a pioneer in carbon trading and 
an international promoter of emissions trading through the Kyoto 
Protocol, the EU has taken the most active approach to promoting 
 
 57. Id. 
 58. See Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for 
Environmental Protection: Integrating Theory and Practice, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 
464 (1992). 
 59. Tseming Yang, The Problem of Maintaining Emission “Caps” In Carbon 
Trading Programs Without Federal Government Involvement: A Brief 
Examination of the Chicago Climate Exchange and the Northeast Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 255, 273 (2006). 
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linkages with other carbon markets.60  In an April 23, 2009 
Directive, the EU’s Council and Parliament attempted to promote 
linkages by instructing that operators in the EU be given 
assurances that carbon credits created pursuant to the Kyoto 
Protocol be recognized as valid credits in the EU ETS.61  
However, the Directive acknowledged that “a procedure should be 
established” that would exclude credits that did not represent 
“real, verifiable, additional[,] and permanent emission reductions 
and have clear sustainable development benefits.”62  This 
reflected the Council’s concerns that Kyoto ’s MRV procedures 
were not rigorous enough to meet the EU ETS standards.  It also 
reflected growing concern that the Kyoto Protocol ’s system might 
become legally inoperative if an agreement was not reached on 
extending the treaty’s legally binding commitments.63 
Even within Europe, harmonizing MRV procedures has 
proven difficult.  Some EU members have extremely well-funded 
and technically capable environmental ministries employing 
state-of-the-art continuous monitoring of major emitters.  Others, 
especially the new Eastern European members, do not have the 
resources to implement such a sophisticated program.  The EU’s 
Directive on MRV procedures allows members to employ either a 
CEM-type system, or a factor-analysis approach, whereby 
emissions are calculated based on an emitter ’s activity data in 
conjunction with a standard set of factors developed by technical 
experts.64  Ideally, the two approaches should yield similar 
results.  However, a calculation-based approach depends far more 
on self-reporting, and can lead to allegations of under-reporting 
that undermine the market’s confidence in the system’s integrity, 
especially if the national regulatory authority fails to invest in 
 
 60. Atle C. Christiansen & Jørgen Wettestad, The EU As Frontrunner on 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading: How Did It Happen and Will the EU 
Succeed?, 3 CLIMATE POL’Y 3, 10 (2003). 
 61. Council Directive 2009/29, 2009 O.J. (L 140) 63 (EC). 
 62. Id. at 67. 
 63. Diarmuid Torney & Noriko Fujiwara, National Commitments, 
Compliance and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol 2-4 (Ctr. for European Policy 
Studies, Working Paper No. 226, 2010). 
 64. Commission Decision 2007/589, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 11 (EC). 
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adequate compliance procedures.65  Since the EU’s ETS depends 
on national-level implementation, different standards can 
produce regulatory arbitrage and allegations of fraud.66 
IV. INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES TO 
IMPROVING MRV PROCEDURES 
Although carbon-market participants might recognize the 
need for more transparent, standardized MRV procedures to 
facilitate market linkages, there is no agreed-upon approach to 
achieve this goal.  The following sections will discuss and 
evaluate the effectiveness of three ideal-type approaches, 
including (1) strengthening the international regulatory 
framework, (2) harmonizing national policies through bilateral or 
multilateral agreements, and (3) establishing transnational MRV 
procedures and auditing processes.  No single approach is 
sufficient to address the challenge posed by inter-market carbon 
trading, but of the three options, a combination of policy 
harmonization and establishing internationally recognized, 
market-based transnational MRV procedures is likely to provide 
the most feasible solution. 
A.   Strengthening the Kyoto Protocol 
In the late 1990s, international consensus appeared to favor 
emissions trading that would take place through a comprehensive 
international regulatory framework.67  The Kyoto Protocol 
contains an agreed-upon set of technical definitions, rules, and 
procedures to allow the trading of carbon credits between 
countries.  Article 17 provides that member states “define the 
relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular 
for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions 
trading.”68  That vague proscription was later transformed into a 
 
 65. John K. Stranlund, James J. Murphy, & John M. Spraggon, An 
Experimental Analysis of Compliance in Dynamic Emissions Markets, 62 J. 
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 414, 427 (2011). 
 66. Jon Birger Skjaerseth, EU Emissions Trading: Legitimacy and 
Stringency, 20 ENVTL. POL’Y & GOVERNANCE 295, 305 (2010). 
 67. For a good example of this type of optimism, see Stuart Eizenstat, Stick 
with Kyoto: A Sound Start on Global Warming, 77 FOREIGN AFF. 119 (1998). 
 68. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 2, at art. 17. 
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market-based mechanism for the trading of emissions credits, 
including Emission Reduction Units (ERU), Certified Emission 
Reductions (CER), Assigned Amount Units (AAU), or Removal 
Units (RMU).69  Each unit relates to an institutional or financial 
mechanism established by the UNFCCC to promote the trading of 
emissions between Annex I countries (historically high emitters 
that have made legally binding commitments to reduce emissions 
on average 5% below 1990 levels by 2012) and between Annex I 
countries and non-Annex I countries.70 
For example, an ERU is generated by reducing one ton of 
CO2 equivalent greenhouse gas emissions by establishing a Joint 
Implementation (JI) project71 with, typically, a non-Annex I 
country.  To be credited with an ERU, a project must meet the 
rules and guidelines established by the JI Supervisory 
Committee.72  If the project meets the Supervisory Committee ’s 
approval, it will be granted a positive determination that verifies 
that the project may submit additional documentation proving a 
reduction in a certain amount of CO2 equivalent greenhouse 
gases that may be credited to the project ’s Annex I partner.  So 
far, thirty-two positive determinations have been made during 
the initial 2008-2012 commitment period under the Kyoto 
Protocol.73  In one such project, the Netherlands received a 
positive determination for a JI project with the Russian 
Federation to reduce the perfluorocarbon (PFC) emissions of a 
Russian aluminum smelter by roughly 749,265.0 t of equivalent 
 
 69. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, 3, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2, Advance Version (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter 
UNFCCC RCPSMPKP Adv.]; Kyoto Protocol Modalities, rules and guidelines, 
supra note 5. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at art. 6. 
 72. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Montreal, 
Can., Nov. 28-Dec. 10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as 
the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter UNFCCC 
RCPSMPKP]. 
 73. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Annual 
Report of the Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee to the Conference of 
the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol,  U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/4 (Oct. 24, 2011). 
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CO2, which once certified, would generate an equal number of 
tradable ERUs.74 
A similar process exists for the Kyoto Protocol ’s Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).  A CDM project typically 
involves a capital investment by an Annex I country, such as an 
upgrade to mass transportation infrastructure or the provision of 
low-cost energy alternatives in rural areas.75  CDMs have been 
far more popular than JIs, in part because they function more 
like traditional foreign aid.  Like the JI, the CDM has an 
Executive Board mandated to review and approve CDM 
projects.76  A state or private investor will design a project, 
receive approval for the project from the national government, 
validate the project with an approved third-party, register with 
the CDM’s Executive Board, receive independent verification of 
the extent of the project’s success, and finally, receive an issuance 
of a CER from the Executive Board.  That CER can then be 
traded between states, or on a private carbon trading market.77 
Although much of the action of the Kyoto Protocol has taken 
place within the CDM, and to a much smaller extent, the JI, the 
foundation of the Protocol rests with the AAUs and RMUs.  An 
AAU is the assigned amount of permitted greenhouse gas 
emissions assessed to each Annex I country in the Kyoto 
Protocol.78  If a global carbon trading market between Annex I 
countries actually existed, AAUs would be integral to the success 
of the Kyoto Protocol’s commitments.  RMUs are a bit more 
complicated.  One RMU is equal to one metric ton of CO2 
equivalent greenhouse gases absorbed by a carbon sink, such as 
 
 74. DET NORSKE VERITAS, DETERMINATION REPORT NO. 2008-1624: REDUCTION 
OF PFC EMISSIONS FROM RUSAL KRASNOYARSK ALUMINUM SMELTER IN RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 7-11 (Oct. 22, 2008);  Reduction of perfluorocarbons emissions from 
RUSAL Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Smelter, UNFCCC JOINT IMPLEMENTATION 
ADVISORY COMM., http://ji.unfccc.int/JIITLProject/DB/6FU0T3C7WY5XWTR9EM 
5JQD5RDVHDSI/details (last visited Oct. 21, 2012). 
 75. The CDM’s Executive Board maintains a searchable listing of approved 
project activities.  Project Search, CLEAN DEV. MECHANISM, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/ projsearch.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2012). 
 76. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 4. 
 77. See generally CLEAN DEV. MECHANISM EXEC. BD., SOURCE PROVISIONS OF 
THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM PROJECT CYCLE PROCEDURE 10 (2011). 
 78. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 24. 
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landfills or carbon capture and storage facilities.79  Despite 
substantial effort to reach agreement on how to measure and 
credit RMUs, carbon sinks remain a particularly contentious 
issue.80  Developing countries see RMUs as a way for developed 
countries to avoid meeting Kyoto commitments.  The only carbon 
sinks that have been successfully incorporated into a Kyoto 
carbon trading unit are those afforestation and reforestation 
efforts that have been certified by the CDM’s Executive Board.81 
B.   Kyoto’s MRV Procedures 
The Kyoto Protocol did not attempt to mandate the use of 
MRV procedures at the national level.  Instead, each tradable 
unit was based on a separate MRV procedure.  The AAUs, which 
were designed to be the principal unit of exchange in a Kyoto-
based emission trading system, would be calculated from GHG 
inventories submitted annually by all Annex I countries.82  The 
reporting requirements largely adopted the methodologies of the 
1996 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories, 
which required countries to (1) identify sources and sinks 
according to a list of categories established by the IPCC, (2) 
identify a relevant time-period for the source or sink (such as 
three-year average), (3) report each estimate of emissions for the 
category in gigagrams, including any uncertainty range, if 
applicable, (4) verify the amount with independently published 
estimates and against the IPCC’s own reference guidelines, and 
(5) document the methodologies, assumptions, and measurements 
 
 79. A carbon sink may also involve land use decisions, such as the 
preservation of an existing forest otherwise targeted for removal.  Crediting 
natural carbon sinks is particularly controversial because it seems a lot like 
blackmail: I will refrain from destroying my environment if you provide me with 
a sufficiently high payoff. 
 80. See Eric C. Betteheim & Gilonned’ Origny, Carbon Sinks and Emissions 
Trading under the Kyoto Protocol: A Legal Analysis, 360 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC’Y 1827 (2002). 
 81. See CLEAN DEV. MECHANISM EXEC. BD., PROJECT DESIGN DOCUMENT, 
ABERDARE RANGE / MT. KENYA SMALL SCALE REFORESTATION INITIATIVE (Jan. 17, 
2011), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/5/H/2/5H2VLI89413SFPXU 
QGCJBNE7K6OWYA/PDD_KirimaraKithithina_ver.05?t=MTh8bWJqdDhnfDC
bJzqAklKjOFFBySGRdf8.  
 82. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 18. 
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used to complete the inventory.83  Each inventory report would 
then receive an individual review by a technical body of the 
secretariat.84  In 2003, following an initial trial period, the eighth 
meeting of the conference of the parties (COP 8) agreed to make 
submissions mandatory for all Annex I parties.  COP 8 undertook 
to revise and streamline the review process, and established 
expert review teams (ERTs) to ensure that each country was 
complying with its reporting requirements.85 
The ERT process has improved the quality of country-level 
GHG inventory reports.  Annex I countries now receive detailed 
feedback from ERTs on the measurement methods employed in 
each IPCC category, including recommendations on best practices 
and suggestions for more accurate estimation methods.86  For 
example, the report on Iceland ’s 2011 submission noted that 
“some mandatory categories are reported as not estimated . . . in 
particular, CO2 emissions and removals from mineral soils under 
cropland and grassland . . . .”87  This type of detailed review 
provides technical guidance meant to gradually push all Annex I 
countries toward more standardized GHG reporting procedures.  
However, the limits of this process are quickly apparent.  The 
IPCC guidelines are generic, and often do not reflect the realities 
of the country’s energy output.  Some countries, such as Ukraine, 
rely heavily on IPCC methods rather than preparing data based 
on actual surveys of the country’s industrial emitters.88  Since 
AAUs are calculated based on an initial report submitted by 
Annex I countries on January 1, 2007 (or one year after the entry 
into force of the Kyoto Protocol), minor variations in reporting 
 
 83. TASK FORCE ON NAT’L GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES, 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, REVISED 1996 IPCC 
GUIDELINES FOR NATIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INVENTORIES 2.1–2.7 (1996), 
available at http://www.ipcc-nggip.iges.or.jp/public/gl/invs4.html. 
 84. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 26-27. 
 85. See UNFCCC RCPSMPKP Adv., supra note 69. 
 86. See UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
KYOTO PROTOCOL REFERENCE MANUAL ON ACCOUNTING OF EMISSIONS AND 
ASSIGNED AMOUNT 26-28 (2008). 
 87. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
individual review of the annual submission of Iceland submitted in 2011 , 9, U.N. 
Doc. FCCC/ARR/2011/ISL (Dec. 19, 2011). 
 88. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the 
individual review of the annual submission of Ukraine submitted in 2011, 53, 
U.N. Doc. FCCC/ARR/2010/UKR (June 3, 2011). 
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methods from year-to-year can result in substantial adjustments 
to a country’s available AAUs.89 
This is an important problem because the AAU trading 
system is supposed to function as a relatively decentralized 
market exchange.  National registries created by all thirty-eight 
signatories serve as accounts for the country’s AAUs.  The 
government, or an entity legally recognized by the government, 
will register its credits through the national system.90  If a seller 
in the EU’s ETS, for example, seeks a trade with a buyer in New 
Zealand, an international transaction log (ITL) kept by the 
UNFCCC secretariat will verify the transaction by checking the 
national registry with other national registries to ensure a 
match.91  The procedures are laid out in data exchange standards 
adopted by the UNFCCC’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA).92  The ITL system functions in 
conjunction with the CDM registry, which accounts for all CERs 
approved by the CDM’s Executive Board.93  The system is 
designed to provide a seamless platform for trading Kyoto credits 
between countries.  Unfortunately, due to technical delays and a 
lack of participation, the majority of tradable credits being 
registered by the system are primarily CERs.94  There has yet to 
develop a market for tradable AAUs, in part because the primary 
trading partners are members of the EU ETS, which keeps a 
separate, but complementary registry for transactions taking 
place within the European Community.95  New Zealand’s 
proposed ETS will utilize Kyoto credits, so there is the potential 
that the ITL will serve as a clearinghouse house for trades 
between New Zealand and the EU, but so far its functionality is 
limited primarily to registering CERs and crediting national 
registries with emissions reductions.96 
 
 89. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 23. 
 90. Id. at 28. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, Data Exchange 
Standards for Registry Systems under the Kyoto Protocol (Dec. 16, 2010). 
 93. UNFCCC RCPSMPKP, supra note 72, at 31. 
 94. Cameron Hepburn, Carbon Trading: A Review of Kyoto Mechanisms, 32 
ANN. REV. ENVTL. RESOURCES 375, 380 (2007). 
 95. Id. at 380-81. 
 96. Perdan & Azapagic, supra note 14, at 6046. 
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Since the CDM’s Executive Board is granted the authority to 
review and approve new projects according to standards and 
methods developed independently from the GHG inventory 
system, CDM has developed its own set of MRVs.  Unlike the 
national inventory process, CDM’s primary concern is with 
validating the emission reductions from a specific project.  At the 
project design phase, a project participant—typically a private 
emitter and a developing country investor—submit a project 
design document that gives a general overview of the project and 
details the methodology being used to calculate an emissions 
reduction.97  The project participant can either propose a new 
methodology, in which case the CDM Executive Board will review 
the proposal and verify its approval of the proposed method, or 
use one of the pre-packaged methods laid out in a CDM 
Methodology Booklet created by the secretariat and approved by 
the Executive Board.98  The monitoring and verification process is 
actually delegated to an accredited third-party designated 
operational entity, such as Det Norske Veritas (DNV), one of the 
largest providers of validation and certification services for CDM 
projects.99  In a typical project, an emitter would contact DNV to 
develop and implement a project design document that complies 
with the CDM’s methodologies.  DNV would then work with its 
client to ensure that the project was designed to properly monitor 
and verify any emissions reductions.  DNV would then certify 
that the project participant had followed the plan.100  The CDM’s 
secretariat and the Executive Board would then vet the project 
and register the reductions as CERs unless at least three of the 
CDM’s board members request a review.101 
 
 97. See CLEAN DEV. MECHANISM EXEC. BD., GUIDELINES FOR COMPLETING THE 
PROJECT DESIGN DOCUMENT (CDM-PDD) AND THE PROPOSED NEW BASELINE AND 
MONITORING METHODOLOGIES (2008). 
 98. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, CDM 
Methodology Booklet (May 2012), http://cdm.unfccc.int/methodologies/ 
documentation/methbooklet.pdf  [hereinafter CDM Methodology Booklet]. 
 99. Carbon Offset Validation & Verification, DET NORSKE VERITAS, 
http://www.dnvusa.com/services/verification/carbon_credit_validation_verificatio
n/index.asp (last visited Aug. 22, 2012). 
 100. DET NORSKE VERITAS, CLIMATE CHANGE SERVICES (2012), available at 
http://www.dnvusa.com/focus/climate_change. 
 101. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 
10, 2005, Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
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The JI process is similar, but substantially less developed.  A 
JI project also delegates MRV to an accredited third party 
certified by the JI Supervisory Committee.102  To initiate a 
project, the parties must provide a project design document 
setting forth the proposed emission reduction and an “appropriate 
baseline and monitoring plan” in accordance with the JI’s 
criteria.103  The accredited third party is responsible for 
monitoring and verifying that the emissions reductions were 
actually achieved, which, according to the criteria, involve “the 
collection and archiving of all relevant data necessary for 
estimating or measuring anthropogenic emissions by sources 
and/or anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases 
occurring within the project boundary during the crediting 
period.”104  Since the CDM has processed far more projects, it has 
developed a more thorough set of methodologies for calculating 
emissions reductions.  To the degree feasible, the JI Supervisory 
Committee applies the CDM’s methodologies to evaluate a JI 
project design document.105  This means that for both Kyoto 
mechanisms, third-party entities are the key component in 
ensuring that proper MRV procedures are followed. 
C.   Problems with the Kyoto Process 
In many respects, the Kyoto process is an ideal framework 
for facilitating international carbon trading.  It has well-
developed technical specifications for preparing annual GHG 
inventories from Annex I countries, the CDM and JI, although 
limited in scope, have successfully approved projects that on 
paper limit GHG emissions, and the institutional framework 
includes a rigorous review and enforcement procedure.  For 
example, in November 2001, the conference of the parties adopted 
 
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2006). 
 102. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 
10, 2005, Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol, Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto 
Protocol, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.2 (Mar. 30, 2006) [hereinafter 
UNFCCC Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6]. 
 103. Id. at 8. 
 104. Id. at 12. 
 105. See JOINT IMPLEMENTATION SUPERVISORY COMM., GUIDANCE ON CRITERIA 
FOR BASELINE SETTING AND MONITORING (Sept. 14, 2011). 
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the Marrakesh Accords, which established a Compliance 
Committee that includes two branches.106  The Facilitative 
Branch provides (1) advice and assistance, (2) facilitates financial 
and technical assistance, and (3) formulates recommendations to 
achieve compliance.107  The Enforcement Branch can declare a 
party in noncompliance with the Protocol ’s monitoring and 
reporting requirements, its eligibility tests for participation in the 
flexibility mechanism, or its emissions targets.108  A question of 
implementation can be brought before either branch by a party or 
through an ERT.  If a noncompliance declaration is made, the 
Enforcement Branch can impose sanctions, including suspension 
from participation in the flexibility mechanisms, requiring the 
preparation of an action plan to achieve compliance, and a 
deduction of its emissions allowance during a subsequent 
commitment period.109  When put in perspective, Kyoto ’s 
compliance procedures are, on paper, equal to or better than 
other multilateral environmental agreements. 
Unfortunately, the Kyoto Protocol suffers from a far more 
fatal flaw.  Although technical discussions have proceeded along 
an upward trajectory, the parties lack the political will to impose 
tougher commitments without greater participation from non-
Annex I countries, especially the BRICs.  Certain Annex I 
members, plus the United States, insist that a new commitment 
period include participation from non-Annex I countries.  
Proposals include requiring non-Annex I countries to submit 
national adaptation or mitigation plans that would be reviewed in 
a manner similar to the annual GHG inventory reports.110  Since 
the Kyoto Protocol’s first five-year commitment period is 
scheduled to end in 2012, parties have been attempting since 
Copenhagen to reach an agreement on a second commitment 
period.  Durban presented the final, scheduled opportunity to 
reach a conclusion, after which the treaty’s legal form would 
lapse.111  Although negotiators reached a last-minute settlement 
 
 106. See UNFCCC Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6, supra note 
102, at 93. 
 107. Id. at 94-95, 101. 
 108. Id. at 95-96. 
 109. Id. at 96, 102. 
 110. Interview with Climate Change Negotiators (Fall 2011). 
 111. See Torney & Fujiwara, supra note 63. 
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that extended the treaty’s legal form to a second commitment 
period lasting until either 2017 or 2020, the Durban COP also 
established a second working group charged with developing an 
alternative to the Kyoto commitments after 2020, presumably one 
that would include non-Annex I commitments.112  For long-time 
observers of the Kyoto negotiations, these agreements appear to 
be stalling for time.  Without a commitment from the United 
States to join the Kyoto Protocol, the political future of the Kyoto 
process appears uncertain. 
It is the political uncertainty of the international regulatory 
environment that makes it an ineffective approach to creating 
linkages between carbon trading markets that are developing 
nationally or regionally.  Investing in international carbon 
trading requires a commitment of substantial financial resources.  
Financial and consulting firms, brokers, and other market 
traders need transparency and stability.  There is very little 
incentive to invest if market participants are constantly worried 
that the Kyoto Protocol’s emission trading system is about to 
collapse.  In addition, any decision to include non-Annex I 
countries could significantly impact the allocation of existing 
AAUs, which increases the risk that a carbon transaction would 
fail.  Carbon transactions across international markets, which are 
primarily in the form of ERUs and CERs, are considered high-
risk investments because of the uncertainty surrounding the 
recognition of those credits in established carbon trading 
markets.  That uncertainty is unlikely to decline now that parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol have endorsed new negotiations under the 
auspices of the Durban Enhanced Action Plan. 
In the long-run, some form of international, 
intergovernmental regulation of carbon trading will be required.  
Unfortunately, there is no guarantee when that regulation will be 
widely adopted or that it will look like the Kyoto mechanisms.  
There is simply too much uncertainty in the political process to 
guarantee the level of coordination necessary to make a complex, 
interdependent emissions trading system like the Kyoto 
mechanism successful.  What is more likely is that the CDM and 
 
 112. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Nov. 28-Dec. 
11, 2011, Durban, S. Afr., Conference of the Parties, Establishment of an Ad Hoc 
Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action, 2, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2012). 
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the JI, which are both supported by a broad coalition of Annex I 
and non-Annex I parties, will continue to operate, producing 
tradable emissions credits that are transferrable with emissions 
credits distributed by national authorities.  The trading in offsets 
will likely be the only international trading that will occur 
through the Kyoto mechanism.  Instead, it is far more probable 
that international trading will take place through bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between different trading schemes.  The 
next section will discuss how to facilitate greater trading through 
the harmonization and mutual recognition of MRV procedures 
among national trading schemes. 
V. COMPARISON OF NATIONAL MRV 
PROCEDURES 
A.   European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
The EU’s ETS was the first carbon trading market to be 
implemented by a regional authority.  Although it was developed 
in response to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU’s ETS actually preceded 
the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol by more than a month.  
Launched in January 2005, the Kyoto Protocol would finally be 
ratified on February 16, 2005.  As a consequence, the ETS was 
not originally intended to incorporate the various flexible 
mechanisms of the Protocol (CDM, JI, and AAU trading).113  
Within the EU, the United Kingdom and Denmark were 
considered the leaders in market-based emissions trading.  
Denmark had established a pilot program for electricity 
generators that ran from 2001 to 2003, but the UK Emissions 
Trading Scheme was the first multi-industry market, and became 
a model program for the Europe-wide initiative.114 
The system employs a complex set of overlapping regulatory 
bodies at the regional and national level.  Each EU member state 
government is given a national emission cap that matches its 
Member State National Allocation Plan (NAP).115  The NAP is 
based on the country’s UNFCCC Annex I-defined binding 
 
 113. See Frank J. Convery, Origins and Development of the EU ETS, 43 
ENVTL. & RES. ECON. 391, 395-96 (2009). 
 114. Id. at 391. 
 115. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 9, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 35-36 (EC). 
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commitments negotiated as part of the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU 
Commission approves each NAP and national emission cap to 
ensure that they meet the requirements of the EU’s Emission 
Trading Directive.116  The NAP is based on the percentage of CO2 
emissions in the EU that is estimated to be released by emitters 
covered under the ETS.  Since this includes less than half of the 
total emissions produced in the Euro-area, member state 
governments are also obligated to make reductions in emissions 
from non-covered sectors such as transportation.117  In practice, 
little effort has been made on directly regulating these sources, 
with the exception of aviation, which was brought into the EU 
ETS scheme in 2008.118 
Since the ETS was based on smaller, less complicated 
national models, the Commission decided to implement the 
program in stages.  Phase I (2005-2007) included a small number 
of industrial sectors that accounted for a significant portion of 
industrial CO2 emissions.119  Roughly 11,500 installations related 
to primary-source energy production, certain industrial 
producers, and the pulp and paper industry were originally 
included.120  Permits were distributed based on the policies of 
each member state government, and during Phase I most of the 
initial permits were provided free of charge, rather than 
auctioned as is typical for mature pollution trading systems.121  
Phase II, implemented in 2008 and scheduled to last until 2012, 
made several important changes.  First, the Commission passed 
its “Linking Directive,” which established a linkage with the 
Kyoto Protocol’s flexible mechanisms.122  Emitters were allowed 
to exchange a certain number of Kyoto Protocol units from CDM 
or JI projects for EU ETS credits.123  Second, the Commission 
agreed to incorporate emissions from aviation activities in the 
Euro-area by 2012.124  Finally, a significant effort was made to 
 
 116. Id. at art. 9a. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at ch. II. 
 119. See Betz & Sato, supra note 56, at 355. 
 120. See Convery, supra note 113, at 407. 
 121. See Council Directive 2003/87, art. 11, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32, 36 (EC). 
 122. Council Directive 2004/101, 2004 O.J. (L 338) 18 (EC) (amending Council 
Directive 2003/87/EC). 
 123. Id. 
 124. See Council Directive 2003/87, art. 11a, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC). 
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increase member state compliance with Council Directives, in 
particular, to improve the detail of member-state submitted 
NAPs. 
i.   Monitoring 
The EU Commission established the most recent regulations 
for monitoring and reporting GHG emissions on June 21, 2012, 
replacing a 2007 Decision with a more comprehensive set of 
technical guidelines.125  The Regulation requires that all GHG 
monitoring and reporting “be complete and cover all process and 
combustion emissions from all emission sources and source 
streams belonging to activities” specified in the technical 
appendix and covered under Council Directive 2003/87/EC.126  
For stationary sources, this includes accounting for any 
“abnormal events including start-up and shutdown and 
emergency situations over the reporting period . . . .”127 
The operator of an installation is given the choice to use a 
calculation-based methodology or a measurement-based 
methodology.128  If the operator adopts a calculation-based 
method, it must select the methodology required under Annex IV 
for its particular industry or “provide[] evidence to the competent 
authorities that the use of such methodology is technically not 
feasible or incurs unreasonable costs, or that another 
methodology leads to a higher overall accuracy of emissions 
data.”129  The Regulations allow the operator to combine different 
monitoring methods at a single installation provided that no 
double accounting occurs.130  At the start of each reporting period, 
the operator is required to submit to its national regulatory 
authority a detailed monitoring plan setting forth the type of 
emissions being measured, the methodology used, and a variety of 
other details about the emission stream.131  Any changes to the 
 
 125. Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 30, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC). 
 126. Id. at art. 5. 
 127. Id. at art. 20. 
 128. Id. at art. 21. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC). 
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operation of the facility that would affect the monitoring plan ’s 
accuracy must be reported to the national regulatory authority.132 
The calculation-based approach applies a simple formula: 
CO2 emissions = activity data X emission factor X oxidation 
factor.133  For combustion emissions, activity data is the fuel flow 
expressed in terms of energy content.134  For process emissions, 
activity data is the material consumption, throughput or 
production output, which is also expressed in terms of energy 
content.135  A conversion factor is applied to address any input 
materials that were not converted to CO2 during the production 
process.136  The EU ETS attempts to minimize the reporting 
requirements for smaller emitters by creating a tier-based 
approach to calculating an installation’s emissions.  Smaller 
installations are permitted to use less accurate calculations, and 
any installation may seek an exemption from the minimum 
requirement if they can show that such calculations are 
technically infeasible or likely to lead to unreasonably high 
costs.137  The Regulation clearly favors direct measurement of 
activity data.  However, if an operator can prove that direct 
measurement is technically infeasible or would lead to 
unreasonably high costs, it can either estimate using data from 
previous years or supply audited financial documents containing 
documented methods that produced data on material use during 
the reporting period.138  The measurement-based approach, 
which employs a CEM system, requires operators to use CEN 
standards issued by the European Committee for 
Standardization.139  If CEN standards are unavailable, the 
operator should look to ISO standards or relevant national 
standards.140  Operators are required to provide hourly 
averages.141  
 
 132. Id. at art. 14. 
 133. Id. at art. 24. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at art. 25. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 26, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC). 
 138. Id. at art. 27. 
 139. Id. at art. 42. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at art. 43. 
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ii.   Reporting 
The Commission requires installation operators to file annual 
reports that include the calculations and other assumptions used 
during the monitoring process.142  These reports are submitted to 
the operator’s national regulatory authority before submission to 
the Commission.143  For the most part, the reporting 
requirements simply ask the operator to show its work by 
including all sources, calculations, measurement methodologies, 
uncertainties, and other assumptions used to arrive at the total 
emissions calculation.144  Emissions from different source 
streams at a single installation that belong to the same type of 
activity can be aggregated by the operator.145  For example, a 
refinery with multiple smokestacks emitting CO2 can aggregate 
its emissions from each source in the final report.  Each report 
must be labeled using both the Common Reporting Format of the 
UNFCCC’s GHG inventory system and the Integrated Pollution 
Prevention and Control code contained in Annex I of Regulation 
166/2006.146  The IPPC codes were developed as part of Directive 
2008/1/EC, which established an integrated method for 
monitoring and reporting industrial pollutants in the European 
Community.147  The practical effect of these requirements is to 
make reporting relatively standardized.  ETS emissions can be 
compared directly with emissions from other Kyoto-compliant 
carbon-trading markets, potentially improving the transparency 
of the trade.  In addition, ETS reporting is not duplicative of 
IPPC reporting, potentially reducing the regulatory burden. 
The Commission also requires rigorous record-keeping.  
Operators are required to keep records sufficient to allow for the 
verification of its annual emissions report, but also to maintain 
an archive of data, including detailed information on the 
calculations used in its measurement methodology, for up to ten 
years.148  To ensure that operators are complying, the 
 
 142. Id. at art. 67. 
 143. Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 67, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC). 
 144. Id. at art. 7. 
 145. Id. at art. 19. 
 146. Id. at art. 73. 
 147. See Council Directive 2008/1, 2008 O.J. (L 24) 8, 19 (EC). 
 148. Commission Regulation 601/2012, art. 66, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 30 (EC). 
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Commission also requires the establishment of a control system 
that ensures that “the annual emissions report . . . resulting from 
the data flow activities does not contain misstatements and is in 
conformity with the monitoring plan and [the Commission ’s] 
Regulation.”149  An approved control system must include “an 
operator’s or aircraft operator’s assessment of inherent risks and 
control risks” and “written procedures related to control activities 
that are to mitigate the risks identified.”150  Those written 
procedures must at least include the following elements: 
(a) quality assurance of the measurement equipment; (b) quality 
assurance of the information technology system used for data 
flow activities, including process control computer technology; (c) 
segregation of duties in the data flow activities and control 
activities as well as management of necessary competencies; (d) 
internal reviews and validation of data; (e) corrections and 
corrective action; (f) control of out-sourced processes; (g) keeping 
records and documentation including the management of 
document versions.151 
The operator is required to periodically evaluate and improve 
its control system through internal audits.152  At the operator’s 
discretion, the control system may reference procedures or 
documents contained in other management systems, including 
the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), ISO 
14001:2004 (environmental management systems), ISO 
9001:2000 (general management systems), and financial control 
systems.153  For quality assurance procedures applied to 
continuous emission measurement systems, operators are 
required to follow EN 14181, Quality Assurance of Automated 
Measuring Systems.154 
 
 149. Id. at art. 58. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. These systems were directly referenced in the Commissions 2007 
Decision, but in the 2012 Regulations the language reads “measurement 
standards traceable to international measurement standards . . . .” Id. at art. 59.  
It is unclear whether this allows the operator to select from a wider set of 
international standards. 
 154. Id. 
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iii.   Verification 
Since the EU is a multi-level governance structure that 
incorporates a variety of different national regulatory schemes, 
verification is particularly difficult.  The first step in the 
verification process is at the national level.  The national 
regulatory authority is the institution that reviews the emissions 
reports of operators within their national jurisdiction.155  Since 
each regulatory authority has its own unique capabilities and 
existing domestic regulations, the Commission’s initial approach 
was to set forth a general set of principles to guide verifiers 
through the process.156  With the promulgation of Phase III 
regulations, the Commission adopted a separate set of regulations 
for verification that dramatically increase the requirements for 
verification, accreditation of third-party verifiers, and standards 
for accrediting bodies in the member states.157 
The initial step is to assess each annual emissions report 
using a strategic and risk analysis.  The strategic analysis 
involves (1) determining whether the annual emissions report has 
been properly approved by the competent national regulatory 
authority, (2) whether the verifier can understand each activity 
undertaken at the installation, and (3) understand the 
monitoring plan and control system.158  Once a strategic analysis 
is complete, the verifier must (1) assess the risk of misstatement 
or omission given the complexity and scope of the operator ’s 
emissions, and (2) develop a verification plan, including a 
description of the activities at the installation and the data 
sampling necessary to verify those activities.159 
Once a verification plan is in place, the verifier must 
determine what actions must be taken to carry out that plan.  
This may include a site visit to visually inspect measurement 
technology or control systems, conduct interviews, or collect other 
necessary evidence.160  If a site visit is not required, the verifier 
 
 155. Council Directive 2003/87, art. 15, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 32 (EC) (“Member 
States shall ensure that the reports submitted by operators pursuant to Article 
14(3) are verified in accordance with the criteria set out in Annex V . . . .”). 
 156. Commission Decision 2007/589, 2007 O.J. (L 229) 1, 30-33 (EC). 
 157. See Commission Regulation 600/2012, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC). 
 158. Id. at art. 11. 
 159. Id. at arts. 12-13. 
 160. Id. at arts. 14, 16, 21. 
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must still carry out the verification plan by collecting enough 
data using the defined sampling methods to determine whether 
the operator’s annual emissions report is accurate.161  If the 
report is missing data, or the verifier identifies noncompliance 
with the installation’s monitoring plan, the verifier must ensure 
that the operator is informed of its misstatements or omissions, 
and correct them before verification is complete.162  The verifier 
must then produce an internal verification report demonstrating 
that the verification plan has been implemented.163  The 2012 
Regulations have added an additional layer of oversight, 
requiring that a third-party verifier submit its internal 
verification report to an independent reviewer.164  The 
independent reviewer, which was not involved in the verification 
process, must then determine whether the third-party verifier 
complied with the Commission’s Regulations when it conducted 
its verification activities.165  After completing the verification 
plan, the verifier produces a final report, an opinion regarding 
compliance, and documentation showing its methodology to the 
operator.166  An operator is then required to submit the 
verification report, along with his annual emissions report, to the 
competent national regulatory authority.167 
It is important to note that a third-party verifier may be 
either a competent national authority or a non-governmental 
private party.  The EU’s regulations require that all verifiers: 
1) Maintain a competence process, which requires 
documentation that the verifiers are trained, properly 
supervised, and subject to periodic internal reviews.168 
2) Assemble a verification team with clearly delineated 
responsibilities and the competence necessary to assess 
the scientific and technical details of the installation ’s 
processes and procedures.169 
 
 161. Id. at arts. 18-20. 
 162. Id. at art. 22. 
 163. Commission Regulation 600/2012, art. 16, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC). 
 164. Id. at art. 25. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at art. 27. 
 167. Id. at art. 74. 
 168. Id. at art. 35. 
 169. Commission Regulation 600/2012, art. 36, 2012 O.J. (L 181) 1 (EC). 
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol30/iss1/8
  
2012]  TRANSNATIONAL CARBON-TRADING  357 
3) Keep clear documentation of verification procedures and 
records of verification activities.170 
4) Ensure that the verifier is impartial and independent of 
the operator, is organized in such a way as to maintain its 
impartiality and independence, and meets the conflict of 
interest requirements found in Article 42, paragraphs 4 
and 5.171 
Verifiers must also be accredited by a national accreditation 
body established by the operator’s national authority pursuant to 
Article 5(1) of Commission Regulation 765/2008.172  If a private 
third-party verifier seeks accreditation, it must provide all 
information requested by the national accreditation body, in 
particular the verifier’s competence process, how it plans to 
maintain continuous impartiality and independence, its technical 
expertise, and the verifier’s record-keeping procedures.173 
Private third-party auditors play an important role in the EU 
ETS system.  They function as the first line of defense against 
mistakes or omissions in the monitoring plans and annual 
emission reports of EU operators.  For example, VerifAvia is an 
accredited verification service for the EU’s aviation sector.174  The 
company offers aviation-sector clients a general service aimed at 
auditing and improving the control systems described above, as 
well as a verification service intended to ensure compliance with 
EU regulations.175  The scope of a private auditor ’s services 
depends on the needs of a client.  Some national governments will 
have substantial environmental regulations already in place that 
require operators to implement certain monitoring technologies.  
Other governments may have very little regulation, requiring a 
third-party verifier to work closely with an operator to ensure the 
implementation of proper monitoring and reporting techniques. 
 
 170. Id. at arts. 40-41. 
 171. Id. at art. 42. 
 172. Id. at art. 45. 
 173. Id. 
 174. See VERIFAVIA, http://www.verifavia.com/en/index.php (last visited Sept. 
30, 2012). 
 175. Id. 
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B.   New Zealand Emissions Trading Scheme 
On September 25, 2008, New Zealand ’s parliament passed 
The Climate Change Response Amendment Act 2008 
(Amendment Act), establishing a wide-ranging emissions trading 
scheme second only in scope to the EU’s ETS.176  The Amendment 
Act will regulate the emissions of all six main GHGs listed in 
Annex A of the Kyoto Protocol.177  The scope of the eventual 
regulations may be even broader than the ETS, encompassing 
forestry, transportation, primary energy generators, industrial 
facilities, agriculture, and waste.178  Agriculture and forestry are 
particularly difficult sectors to regulate effectively.  In the case of 
large agricultural producers, the primary GHGs are CH4 and N20.  
CH4 is released as a byproduct of animal waste, and at a technical 
level, estimating CH4 emissions based on the size of animal herds 
is actually far easier than achieving accurate measurements of 
smokestack emissions.179  N20 emissions occur largely through 
the use of fertilizers, and measuring this type of emission will 
likely depend on self-reporting and the occasional audit.  What is 
surprising about New Zealand ’s program is that agricultural 
producers are an especially influential political constituent, 
making regulations politically costly to impose.180 
Like the EU, New Zealand’s trading scheme also imposes its 
emission reduction targets at producers or importers who are 
sufficiently high in the supply chain.  After its first year of 
operation, New Zealand’s ETS has ninety-six mandatory 
participants, primarily in the coal and natural gas sectors.181  By 
placing the point of obligation upstream, MRV procedures are 
 
 176. Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008 
(N.Z.). 
 177. This includes CO2, CH4, N20, hyroflurocarbons (HFCs), PFCs, and 
sulphur hexafluoride. 
 178. See Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2008, 
Third Schedule (N.Z.). 
 179. See Philip Robertson et al., Greenhouse Gases in Intensive Agriculture: 
Contributions of Individual Gases to the Radiative Forcing of the Atmosphere, 
289 SCI. 1922 (2000). 
 180. Within the EU, this is even more difficult given the prominent role played 
by the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy. See David Bullock, Emissions Trading 
in New Zealand: Development, Challenges, and Design, 21 ENVTL. POL. 657 
(2012). 
 181. N.Z. EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME, supra note 46, at 7. 
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more cost-effective.  However, it risks insulating consumers from 
the price changes associated with emissions reductions.182  It also 
risks making the emissions trading market substantially less 
liquid.  There will be fewer trades, and fewer tradable credits, 
than if the market involved smaller emitters, making it more 
susceptible to market manipulation.  However, this is partially 
offset by New Zealand’s decision to comprehensively cover all 
major industrial sectors. 
Another special variation of the New Zealand scheme is that 
its cap is set in reference to New Zealand ’s AAUs allocated 
through the Kyoto Protocol’s legally binding commitments.183  
This allows the government to issue New Zealand Units (NZUs) 
that are directly based on the total allowable CO2 equivalent tons 
of greenhouse emissions provided under the country ’s Annex I 
commitment, and allows the emitter to import energy units from 
Kyoto-approved mechanisms, such as the CDM or JI projects.  
Unlike the EU ETS, which has received substantial criticism 
from developing countries for walling off CDM or JI projects from 
access to its market, New Zealand ’s ETS will provide complete 
compatibility with Kyoto-based market mechanisms.184  A JI 
project formed with an Indonesian industrial producer that 
receives certification for a particular amount of EMUs could be 
imported to New Zealand to provide an equal number of NZUs.  
Unfortunately, since New Zealand is the only major ETS to create 
complete compatibility, it does not necessarily mean that the ETS 
will be easier to link with other carbon markets.  An emitter 
seeking to export EMUs from within the Eurozone will still have 
to conform to the EU’s ETS regulations. 
The obvious downside for New Zealand emitters is that once 
the program is fully up and running (estimated to be sometime 
before the end of 2013), they will have to deal with a cap on total 
emissions that is equal to the legally binding commitments 
contained in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol.  The EU ETS was 
established to insulate European producers from the full 
 
 182. Robbie Andrew & Vicky Forgie, A three-perspective view of greenhouse gas 
emission responsibilities in New Zealand, 68 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 194 (2008). 
 183. Climate Change Response Act 2002, pt. 4, cl 68, 69(2) (N.Z.) [hereinafter 
C.C. Response Act]. 
 184. Nan Jiang et al., New Zealand’s Emissions Trading Scheme, 43 N.Z. 
ECON. PAPERS 69 (2009). 
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consequences of the Kyoto commitments until the Protocol 
became fully implemented by every Annex I member state.185  
The EU had no intention of creating a trading scheme that would 
let its domestic producers suffer relative to its strategic economic 
competitors.  There has been some suggestion that the New 
Zealand government, through the purchase of CERs or AAUs, 
might lower the initial risk to New Zealand producers.  The 
government would purchase CERs or AAUs using the Kyoto 
trading system, which would reduce the overall cap on industry 
that would be required to meet New Zealand’s Kyoto 
commitments.186  However, to successfully use this strategy New 
Zealand will have to establish standards and procedures for 
linking its market to other ETS systems, especially given the 
differing standards for assessing inter-market trading in the EU 
ETS. 
i.   Monitoring and Reporting 
Since the New Zealand ETS is being implemented on a 
sector-by-sector basis, this Comment focuses on the sectors that, 
under current law, are obligated to report emissions.  This 
includes forestry, stationary energy sources, industrial processes, 
and liquid fossil fuels.187  Unlike the EU ETS, which has a 
standard monitoring and reporting framework for each sector, the 
New Zealand ETS provides separate regulations applicable to 
each.  To the degree possible, sector requirements will be 
presented side-by-side.  For stationary energy sources and 
industrial processes, the ETS primarily requires calculation-
based methodology similar to the EU ETS model.188  For 
example, a coal-fired power plant is required to account for 
imported coal using a formula that incorporates the total amount 
of coal (imports minus exports), the energy content, any 
adjustment from stockpiling, and any unique emissions factors.189  
Different formulas are required for mined coal or for any coal 
 
 185. Convery, supra note 113, at 399. 
 186. Bullock, supra note 180, at 671. 
 187. See Climate Change Response Act 2002, Third Schedule, cl 1-6 (N.Z.). 
 188. See, e.g., Climate Change (Stationary Energy and Industrial Processes) 
Regulations 2009, SR 2009/285, reg 35 (N.Z.) (calculation method for producers 
of aluminum) [hereinafter Energy and Indus. Regs.]. 
 189. Id. at reg 8. 
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converted to gas using a UCG operation.190  Similar formulas are 
required for natural gas, geothermal fluid, municipal waste or 
waste oil, and petroleum refining.  For certain measurements, 
participants are required to employ continuous monitoring 
technologies.191  To measure mined natural gas emissions, the 
operator is required, where possible, to sample every thirty 
minutes, or else at least at intervals of not longer than three 
months.  The samples must then be tested by a government 
laboratory or an accredited laboratory complying with ISO 
17025:2005.192  CEM may also be used by an operator combusting 
oil, waste oil, used tires, or municipal waste.193 
Measurement of industrial processes occurs solely through 
calculation-based methods.  Each industrial sector is divided into 
a category based on either the material used or the type of gas 
emitted, such as perfluorocarbons or aluminum smelting.  The 
emitter is responsible for collecting activity-based information 
and properly applying the factors listed.194  For liquid fossil fuel 
users, the ETS requires an accounting of the type and volume of 
fuel removed for either home, industrial, or transportation 
consumption.195  The regulations exempt users who employ an 
amount of fuel below a threshold set by Regulation 5, which 
means only heavy users of liquid fuels will be required to monitor 
and report.196  To calculate total emissions, the user must provide 
the amount of fuel used and any unique emissions factors.197  One 
feature of New Zealand’s regulations is the attempt to address 
potential leakages by including so-called “opt-in participants.”  
These are entities otherwise not regulated who purchase more 
than a specified amount of either coal or natural gas.198  This 
feature prevents circumventing reporting requirements by 
purchasing arrangements through third-parties. 
 
 190. Id. at reg 11(1). 
 191. E.g., id. at reg 16(3). 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at reg 24. 
 194. E.g., Energy and Indus. Regs., supra note 188, at reg 34  (aluminum 
producers). 
 195. Climate Change (Liquid Fossil Fuels) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/356, reg 
5 (N.Z.) [hereinafter Fossil Fuels Regs.]. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Energy and Indus. Regs., supra note 188, at reg 44(G). 
 198. Id. at regs 45, 48. 
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Each participant is required to submit an annual emission 
return that contains (1) a record of the participant ’s activities, (2) 
the measurement methodology employed and any corresponding 
calculations, (3) an assessment of the participant’s liability to 
surrender NZUs based on the annual emissions, and (4) any 
additional requirements contained in the Ministry of Economic 
Development’s (MED) regulations.199  Participants are required 
to maintain records that allow the MED to verify emissions 
reductions.  These include sales receipts or invoices, customs 
documentation, supplier contracts or agreements, or any other 
document produced during the monitoring process, such as lab 
reports or internal audits.200  Like the EU ETS, participants are 
required to maintain some type of internal quality control 
process.201  One distinctive aspect of the New Zealand system is 
that participants can seek to apply a unique emissions factor by 
applying to the MED.  The participant must prove that the 
unique emissions factor differs substantially from the generic 
factor for that type of fuel.202  It must then undergo an “activity-
specific prescribed sampling and testing regime” and be verified 
by a recognized verifier.203  This is a key component of New 
Zealand’s ETS because third-party verification of emissions 
reports is only required if the participant has applied for and 
received permission to use a unique emissions factor. 
Under the New Zealand Emission Trading Scheme (ETS), 
each participant receives a limited number of NZU, which are 
distributed in proportion to each industry’s contribution to New 
Zealand’s Annex I Kyoto Protocol target.204  One NZU is equal to 
one ton of CO2 equivalent greenhouse gas, and is designed to be 
directly transferrable with the Kyoto Protocol’s trading units.  A 
unique aspect of New Zealand ’s ETS is the participation of the 
forestry sector.  The owner of any forested area larger than one 
 
 199. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 65. 
 200. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY FOR THE ENV’T, REPORTING GUIDANCE FOR THE 
STATIONARY ENERGY AND INDUSTRIAL PROCESSES AND LIQUID FOSSIL FUELS 
SECTORS UNDER THE NEW ZEALAND EMISSIONS TRADING SCHEME 4 (2009) 
[hereinafter N.Z. REPORTING GUIDANCE]. 
 201. Id. at 7. 
 202. Climate Change (Unique Emissions Factors) Regulations 2009, SR 
2009/286, reg 4(2)(b)(i) (N.Z.) [hereinafter Unique Emissions Regs.]. 
 203. Id. at reg 4. 
 204. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 68. 
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hectare can participate as long as each hectare has more than 
30% tree crown cover.205  Forestry participants are divided 
between owners of land forested prior to December 31, 1989 and 
owners of land with forested areas established after that date.206  
Since the legislation is primarily intended to prevent 
deforestation, participation by pre-1990 land owners is 
mandatory if the landowner deforests more than two acres during 
the ETS’s five-year commitment period.207  Post-1990 land 
owners can volunteer to participate in order to receive credit for 
reforestation projects.208 
For pre-1990 owners, the ETS allocates a specific number of 
NZUs based on the total forested area as of January 1, 2008.209  
For land that has not changed ownership arrangements since 
October 31, 2002, the owner will be allocated sixty NZUs.210  
Owners that received the forested area by transfer after that date 
will be allocated thirty-nine NZUs.211  The owner of any land held 
under New Zealand’s Crown forest license that was or will be 
transferred to a New Zealand indigenous group under a treaty of 
settlement will receive eighteen NZUs.212  The ETS exempts pre-
1990 owners from submitting annual monitoring reports, but does 
impose a reporting requirement for any deforestation.213  The 
pre-1990s owner must establish evidence of ownership, provide a 
geospatial map of the area, and be capable of providing aerial 
photos, planting records, or tree ages if there is any doubt from 
the records that the area was forested before 1990.214 
Post-1990 owners of forested lands are not required to 
participate in the ETS, but can receive NZUs for any measurable 
increase in forested area on their property since 1990.215  To 
 
 205. Id. at pt. 5, cl 179(1)(b). 
 206. Id. at pt. 5, cl 180(1). 
 207. Climate Change Response Act 2002, Third Schedule, pt. 1 (N.Z.). 
 208. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 5, cl 187. 
 209. Id. at, pt. 4, cl 72(2)(b) (N.Z.). 
 210. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY, A GUIDE TO THE PRE-1990 
FORESTRY ALLOCATION AND EXEMPTIONS 5 (2010). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 6. 
 213. Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/355, reg 17 
(N.Z.). 
 214. NEW ZEALAND MINISTRY OF AGRIC. & FORESTRY, supra note 210, at 10. 
 215. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 5, cl 188. 
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qualify, applicants are required to create an electronic map and 
assign certain areas of the map as carbon accounting areas 
(CAAs).216  The participant then submits periodic emissions 
returns to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) to 
show increases of the forested areas contained in their CAA.217  
Voluntary returns can be submitted as often as the participant 
desires, but a mandatory return is required at the end of the five-
year commitment period.218  The MAF provides detailed 
instructions on calculating the increase in a forested area based 
on the geospatial mapping submitted by the participant.219  Once 
MAF determines the appropriate growth in the CAA ’s carbon 
stock, the ministry releases the NZUs to the participants’ trading 
account. 
ii.   Verification 
Since the New Zealand ETS is not a supranational authority, 
its ETS regulations apply more typical command and control 
verification procedures.  Section 94 grants an authorized agent of 
the Environmental Protection Authority (N.Z. EPA) the ability to 
request “information that is reasonably necessary” to ascertain 
whether a person is in compliance all relevant regulations.220  
This power is supplemented with the authority to require an in-
person appearance before an appointed agent and the production 
of documents in the person’s possession.221  An appointed agent 
may also enter any land or premises at any reasonable time 
during normal business hours to conduct an investigation into 
whether the person is in compliance with the monitoring and 
reporting requirements of the ETS.222  When necessary, the N.Z. 
EPA can request a judicial inquiry before a district court judge.223  
Sections 129 through 143 establish penalties for non-compliance, 
 
 216. Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/355, reg 18 
(N.Z.). 
 217. Id. at reg 20. 
 218. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 5, cl 189(9). 
 219. Climate Change (Forestry Sector) Regulations 2008, SR 2008/355, Fifth 
Schedule (N.Z.). 
 220. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 94(1). 
 221. Id. at pt. 4, cl 95(1). 
 222. Id. at pt. 4, cl 100(1). 
 223. Id. at pt. 4, cl 96(1). 
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evasion, failing to surrender NZU units upon the request of the 
N.Z. EPA, and failure to submit the required documentation.224 
As mentioned above, only those participants seeking to apply 
a unique emissions factor are required to achieve third-party 
verification before submitting an annual emissions report.225  The 
N.Z. EPA is authorized by statute to “recognize a person or 
organisation with the prescribed expertise, technical competence, 
or qualifications . . .” necessary to undertake verification 
procedures for the approval of a unique emissions factor.226  
Compared to the EU ETS, this provides a very limited statutory 
role for a third-party auditor.  However, the statute permits any 
participant to submit verification of an annual emission report by 
a third-party verifier, and the MED guidebook encourages 
participants to do so.227  Once again, private, third-party auditors 
are stepping into the regulatory space to provide certainty for 
New Zealand’s ETS participants.  Deloitte’s New Zealand office is 
a recognized third-party verifier and offers to “[v]erify that your 
emissions return and reporting methodologies comply with the 
regulations” for clients seeking to minimize the risk of 
noncompliance.228  Unlike the EU ETS, the primary 
responsibility for verification still rests with the N.Z. EPA. 
C.   Opportunities for Policy Harmonization 
Of the three regulatory approaches, the EU and New Zealand 
have the most closely aligned MRV procedures for the types of 
industries typically regulated under an emissions trading system.  
Both rely primarily on calculation-based monitoring procedures, 
employing a factor analysis that is similar in almost all 
meaningful respects.  Although New Zealand ’s verification 
procedures rely less on third-party verifiers, the statute provides 
the N.Z. EPA with substantial authority to audit, investigate, and 
penalize any noncompliance.  Since the system is designed to 
 
 224. Id. at pt. 4, cl 129-43. 
 225. Unique Emissions Regs., supra note 202, at reg 4(2)(d). 
 226. C.C. Response Act, supra note 183, at pt. 4, cl 92(1); see also id. at cl 
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 228. Managing ETS Compliance, DELOITTE, http://www.deloitte.com/view/en_ 
NZ/nz/services/climate-change-andsustainability/managing etscompliance/index. 
htm  (last visited Apr. 12, 2012). 
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target consumption at the highest level of the energy supply 
chain, regulators are only presently enforcing compliance on 
ninety-six active participants.229  The vast majority of those 
participants are sophisticated business enterprises who can 
reasonably be expected to know how to navigate New Zealand ’s 
regulatory requirements.  What might present more of a 
challenge is whether New Zealand ’s government will be willing to 
accept the third-party verification procedures of the EU ETS.  
The sheer size of the regulated market means that the EU 
Commission and the relevant national regulatory authorities will 
be required to address a more diverse and potentially less 
sophisticated set of participants.  The Commission itself is limited 
to reviewing verification determinations from Member States 
through an awkward consultation process prescribed by Council 
Directive 2003.230  If more reports surface of an EU process that 
lacks the requisite oversight of third-party verifiers, New Zealand 
regulators may be hesitant to recognize certain EU ETS 
emissions credits. 
Although both markets will eventually make their domestic 
credits directly transferrable to Kyoto units, the New Zealand 
ETS’s NZUs are transferrable on a one-to-one basis with other 
Kyoto units.231  This allows New Zealand participants to acquire 
ERUs or CERs through Kyoto ’s JI or CDM system and apply 
them to meeting their domestic allowance.232  The EU has been 
less willing to grant ERUs or CERs direct transferability based 
on concerns that the MRV procedures in place at the CDM 
Executive Board or the JI Supervisory Committee are insufficient 
to guarantee real and verifiable emissions reductions.  If the EU 
ends up keeping a separate registry for internal market trading, 
it will make international carbon trading more difficult.  A seller 
seeking to enter the EU ETS market would have to demonstrate 
that the credit was either a recognized NZU provided by the N.Z. 
EPA or a Kyoto unit that meets the requirements of the EU 
Commission.  In addition, because the New Zealand system is 
designed to adjust its allocation based on the five-year Kyoto 
commitment period, any revision of the allocation allowances at 
 
 229. See discussion supra Part II. 
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the end of the five-year period could mean retiring certain 
allowances and adjusting the allowances held by all other 
participants.  This reorganization would make it extremely 
difficult to allow international brokers to bank tradable credits or 
engage in futures trading, both of which can improve the 
efficiency of carbon markets if implemented properly.233 
The easiest solution to these issues is likely an implementing 
agreement between the EU ETS and New Zealand ETS that 
would clarify the transferability of credits.  Such an agreement 
would (1) specify the terms under which credits could be 
transferred, including an official exchange rate for NZUs and EU 
ETS emissions credits (assuming that the Commission does not 
officially link its credits with Kyoto AAUs), (2) the type of market 
activities permitted, (3) the proper registration procedures 
tracking credit transfers, and (4) the bilateral recognition of 
regulatory determinations made in both markets by the relevant 
market regulatory authorities.234  Although both countries are 
actively considering such an agreement, the EU Commission has 
made it clear that New Zealand’s forestry offsets are incompatible 
with the EU’s approach.235  The offsets encourage so-called 
carbon arbitrage, whereby credits purchased outside of the EU 
ETS flood the market, resulting in no net reduction in overall 
emissions.  This problem could be solved through an 
implementing agreement that either discounts New Zealand 
credits or specifically identifies and prevents trading NZUs 
earned through forestry offsets, but such an agreement would be 
 
 233. In fact, the EU has examined this problem extensively and concluded 
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politically difficult given the importance of the forestry program 
to New Zealand’s government.236 
The effectiveness of the harmonization approach is limited by 
the political reality that adjusting hard-fought regulations to 
accommodate market linkage may not be politically feasible.  A 
bilateral agreement between the EU ETS and the New Zealand 
ETS could feasibly address the real differences in MRV 
procedures that might prevent carbon trading.  However, New 
Zealand’s government is politically committed to a wider ETS, 
which rewards certain domestic industries with financial benefits 
in the form of generous carbon offsets.  The EU ETS is less 
capable of increasing market participation to include other 
political sectors because of the limits of political agreement 
between EU Member States.  Ensuring compliance with EU 
Commission Directives within the European Community has 
proven far more difficult than was anticipated by early 
Commission studies of the problem.237  In addition, Europol has 
recently identified the manipulation of carbon trading as a key 
avenue for organized crime in Europe, citing evidence that the 
diversity of different regulatory approaches within the European 
Community contributes to regulatory arbitrage by potential 
criminals seeking to defraud energy trading markets.238 
VI. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
AUDITING STANDARDS 
In an ideal world, the Kyoto Protocol ’s agreed-upon 
methodologies and technical definitions would establish 
standards for each country’s carbon trading market.  However, in 
the absence of national commitments to universally adopt and 
apply Kyoto standards, an alternative can be achieved through 
transnational coordination of private parties.  For example, the 
International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) 
develops International Standards on Auditing (ISAs) that are 
 
 236. The EU Commission’s attitude is a bit disingenuous because the EU ETS 
already permits ERUs earned through the CDM, which New Zealand’s forestry 
participants could earn by applying to the CDM directly. 
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widely recognized as the premiere transnational standards in 
financial auditing.239  The existence of ISAs on a wide variety of 
accounting procedures has standardized the international 
practice of financial accounting, while improving the 
transparency of firms seeking to attract investors from a diversity 
of different domestic regulatory structures.240 
A similar process would allow investors to develop confidence 
in the monitoring and verification of emissions reductions 
represented in either credits or offsets.  An EU broker could then 
have confidence that emissions offsets put together in New 
Zealand would be based on similar technical standards.  An 
environmental transnational auditing standard could also be 
flexible enough to incorporate the diversity of different 
approaches to monitoring, reporting, and verifying carbon 
emissions that are currently being developed in the various 
regional markets.241  Those countries with the regulatory 
capacity to establish national standards could work closely with 
such a standard-setting agency to help develop best practices.  
Firms in developing countries with little regulatory capacity 
could use the international standards to increase transparency 
and encourage partnerships through JIs or projects funded 
through the CDM.  A standards board could also allow the 
regional trading markets in the United States to coordinate with 
international markets without an EPA program in place.242 
Such private standards are already commonly employed to 
certify carbon offsets in privately traded markets.  For example, 
the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS), formerly the Voluntary 
Carbon Standard, was formed by a consortium of business and 
environmental leaders to develop greater quality assurance for 
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carbon offsets traded in voluntary carbon markets.243  The VCS 
standard is used to evaluate methodologies for measuring 
reductions in carbon emissions from third-party participants.244  
A potential methodology is submitted to the VCS, evaluated and 
verified by an approved validation/verification body (VVB), and, if 
the method is used in a project, the verified emissions reductions 
are registered as Voluntary Carbon Units with a VCS-approved 
registry.245  Unfortunately, the rigor of the VCS depends on the 
validation of certain methodologies, which takes place through 
third-party VVBs.246  VCS is not equipped to independently 
approve third-party verifiers, so it relies on accreditation received 
from either a GHG program recognized by the VCS, such as the 
CDM, JI, or California’s Climate Action Reserve, or through 
accreditation received from a member of the International 
Accreditation Body under ISO 14065.247 
The Gold Standard offers a similar certification, but limits its 
third-party certification to only those verifiers recognized by an 
UN-accredited auditor, such as a CDM’s DOE.248  Gold Standard 
certification also involves more procedural certification, including 
engagement with local stakeholders and a final review by the 
Gold Standard’s own Technical Advisory Committee.249  The Gold 
Standard also limits the approval of methodologies to those 
recognized by the CDM, and a handful of other projects approved 
by the Secretariat.250  The stricter methodologies limits 
participation in the certification program, but has ensured that 
more certified projects achieve intended reductions.  The Chicago 
Climate Exchange (CCX) also employs third-party verifiers, and 
once again presumptively approves DOEs recognized by the 
CDM.251 
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VII. EXPANDING MARKET LINKAGES THROUGH 
THIRD-PARTY VERIFICATION OF 
MONITORING AND REPORTING 
PROCEDURES 
Third-party verifiers are very much the backbone of carbon 
trading markets.  In the EU ETS, third-party verifiers are called 
upon to independently assess and provide an opinion on the 
quality and accuracy of operator’s annual emissions reports.252  
EU operators are encouraged to consult third-party verifiers on 
auditing control standards and ensuring the development of a 
proper monitoring plan.253  Although New Zealand’s ETS 
participants are not required to use third-party verification 
unless they intend to use a unique emissions factor in their 
calculation-based measurement methodology, most participants 
elect to use third-party verifiers, and are encouraged to do so by 
New Zealand’s EPA.254  The CDM depends heavily on third-party 
verifiers for developing CDM-approved methodologies for various 
offset projects and ensuring that emissions reductions are being 
achieved.255  As a consequence, most voluntary standards also 
depend on third-party verifiers because they rely so heavily on 
CDM methodologies and require similar third-party auditing of 
any voluntary carbon reduction project.256 
The three principle barriers to international trading of 
carbon credits is the (1) lack of mutually acceptable 
methodologies for measuring carbon emissions and reductions, (2) 
differing methods for reporting, monitoring, and verifying 
emission activities, and (3) variation in the number of 
participating industries and emitters.  Since third-party verifiers 
already play such an important role in emission trading schemes, 
it seems logical that third-party verifiers could also play an 
important role in reducing the barriers to international carbon 
trading.  One option to address this problem is to create a 
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separate international body designed specifically to accredit 
third-party verifiers, approve emission reduction methodologies, 
and establish internationally recognized MRV procedures.  An 
international body designed and managed by national and 
regional regulatory authorities could provide the foundation for 
developing greater confidence in international carbon trading 
markets. 
Third-party verifiers are already involved in establishing 
internationally recognized methodologies for calculating carbon 
offsets.  The CDM has approved a wide range of methodologies for 
offset projects created by accredited DOEs.257  The CDM relies 
upon DOEs to develop standardized and replicable emission 
measurement procedures for each project, which can then be 
applied to similar projects by other participants.258  The CDM 
process has been rightly criticized for failing to properly oversee 
the accreditation of DOEs and the approval of methodologies with 
dubious technical assumptions.259  In particular, the CDM is not 
equipped to provide verification of emission reductions from each 
project, especially for projects in countries without a strong 
history of regulatory oversight.  The CDM is also an inherently 
political body, attached to the unhealthy dynamics of the 
UNFCCC process.  Even if the CDM were to develop a better 
accreditation process and increase its MRV procedures, it is still 
designed primarily as a tool for non-Annex I members.260  Its 
primary concern is not establishing market confidence in tradable 
emission credits. 
An international body similar to the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) could address this problem 
by formulating agreed upon rules and procedures for accrediting 
third-party verifiers, evaluating methodologies for calculating 
emission reductions, and verifying emissions through appropriate 
monitoring and reporting requirements.  Like the IASB, the 
international body would consist of members of the private sector 
engaged in international carbon trading, but would also include 
national or regional authorities who regulate carbon markets.  
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The organization’s goals would be to establish a rigorous 
accreditation process for third-party verifiers such that if a 
company met the body’s accreditation requirements it would be 
recognized as a third-party verifier in all participating carbon 
markets, as well as with the CDM.  In addition, the body would 
evaluate and approve methodologies for carbon offsets, 
independent of the CDM, which, if approved, could be traded 
internationally in all participating carbon markets.  This would 
provide a guarantee to any investor in a carbon offset project that 
the credits would be able to be traded at a specified value in any 
participating carbon markets.  Finally, the body would maintain 
approved MRV procedures, including appropriate calculation-
based methods for various industrial processes, standards for 
calibrating and maintaining continuous monitoring devices, 
standards for record-keeping and reporting, and internal and 
external review procedures, including standards for third-party 
verification.261 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The collapse of the UNFCCC’s Kyoto Protocol has created a 
chaotic international regulatory environment that threatens to 
undermine confidence in newly formed, or forming, carbon 
trading markets.  Rather than wait for the international 
environment to improve, an alternative approach is to encourage 
internationally recognized environmental auditing standards that 
would allow the transnational coordination of trading markets 
and improve the transparency of carbon credits and offsets.  
Although potentially difficult to establish, such standards could 
serve to fill in the gaps left by the failed Kyoto Protocol, allowing 
countries with the political will to move forward without waiting 
for a consensus-based process. 
An international body similar to the IASB could facilitate 
international carbon trading by setting standards for the 
accreditation for third-party verifiers, evaluating and approving 
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methodologies for calculating carbon emissions and reductions 
from offsets, and coordinating the harmonization of technical 
standards for MRV procedures.  Although not a replacement for 
the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon trading mechanisms, an independent 
international body formed by private parties engaged in carbon 
trading and by national and regional authorities that regulate 
carbon markets could provide investors and financial 
intermediaries with an assurance that a carbon credit purchased 
in one market can be readily traded with another market without 
the risk that the regulating authority will refuse to recognize its 
validity.  This would improve the functioning of carbon markets 
by increasing market efficiency, allowing firms to recognize 
greater benefits from participating in emission trading schemes. 
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